I
di Amin addresses the United Nations General Assembly in
New York, October 1975.
Courtesy United Nations (T. Chen)
A month before the liberation of Kampala, representatives of twenty-two Ugandan civilian and military groups were hastily called together at Moshi, Tanzania, to try to agree on an interim civilian government once Amin was removed. Called the Unity Conference in the hope that unity might prevail, it managed to establish the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) as political representative of the UNLA. Dr. Yusuf Lule, former principal of Makerere University, became head of the UNLF executive committee. As an academic rather than a politician, Lule was not regarded as a threat to any of the contending factions. Shortly after Amin's departure, Lule and the UNLF moved to Kampala, where they established an interim government. Lule became president, advised by a temporary parliament, the National Consultative Council (NCC). The NCC, in turn, was composed of representatives from the Unity Conference.
Conflict surfaced immediately between Lule and some of the more radical of the council members who saw him as too conservative, too autocratic, and too willing as a Muganda to listen to advice from other Baganda. After only three months, with the apparent approval of Nyerere, whose troops still controlled Kampala, Lule was forcibly removed from office and exiled. He was replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, a Muganda like Lule, but one who had previously served as a high-ranking member of Obote's UPC. It was not an auspicious start to the rebuilding of a new Uganda, which required political and economic stability. Indeed, the quarrels within the NCC, which Binaisa enlarged to 127 members, revealed that many rival and would-be politicians who had returned from exile were resuming their self-interested operating styles. Ugandans who endured the deprivations of the Amin era became even more disillusioned with their leaders. Binaisa managed to stay in office longer than Lule, but his inability to gain control over a burgeoning new military presence proved to be his downfall.
At the beginning of the interim government, the military numbered fewer than 1,000 troops who had fought alongside the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) to expel Amin. The army was back to the size of the original King's African Rifles (KAR) at independence in 1962. But in 1979, in an attempt to consolidate support for the future, such leaders as Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and Major General (later Chief of Staff) David Oyite Ojok began to enroll thousands of recruits into what were rapidly becoming their private armies. Museveni's 80 original soldiers grew to 8,000; Ojok's original 600 became 24,000. When Binaisa sought to curb the use of these militias, which were harassing and detaining political opponents, he was overthrown in a military coup on May 10, 1980. The coup was engineered by Ojok, Museveni, and others acting under the general direction of Paulo Muwanga, Obote's right-hand man and chair of the Military Commission (see The Second Obote Regime: Repression Continues , ch. 5). The TPDF was still providing necessary security while Uganda's police force--which had been decimated by Amin--was rebuilt, but Nyerere refused to help Binaisa retain power. Many Ugandans claimed that although Nyerere did not impose his own choice on Uganda, he indirectly facilitated the return to power of his old friend and ally, Milton Obote. In any case, the Military Commission headed by Muwanga effectively governed Uganda during the six months leading up to the national elections of December 1980.
Further evidence of the militarization of Ugandan politics was provided by the proposed expenditures of the newly empowered Military Commission. Security and defense were to be allotted more than 30 percent of the national revenues. For a country desperately seeking funds for economic recovery from the excesses of the previous military regime, this allocation seemed unreasonable to civilian leaders.
Shortly after Muwanga's 1980 coup, Obote made a triumphant return from Tanzania. In the months before the December elections, he began to rally his former UPC supporters. Ominously, in view of recent Ugandan history, he often appeared on the platform with General Oyite-Ojok, a fellow Langi. Obote also began to speak of the need to return to a UPC one-party state.
The national election on December 10, 1980, was a crucial turning point for Uganda. It was, after all, the first election in eighteen years. Several parties contested, the most important of which were Obote's UPC and the DP led by Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere. Most of Uganda's Roman Catholics were DP members, along with many others whose main concern was to prevent the return of another Obote regime. Because the Military Commission, as the acting government, was dominated by Obote supporters (notably chairman Paulo Muwanga), the DP and other contenders faced formidable obstacles. By election day, the UPC had achieved some exceptional advantages, summarized by Minority Rights Group Report Number 66 as follows: Seventeen UPC candidates were declared "unopposed" by the simple procedure of not allowing DP or other candidates to run against them. Fourteen district commissioners, who were expected to supervise local polling, were replaced with UPC nominees. The chief justice of Uganda, to whom complaints of election irregularities would have to be made, was replaced with a UPC member. In a number of districts, non-UPC candidates were arrested, and one was murdered. Even before the election, the government press and Radio Uganda appeared to treat the UPC as the victor. Muwanga insisted that each party have a separate ballot box on election day, thus negating the right of secret ballot. There were a number of other moves to aid the UPC, including Muwanga's statement that the future parliament would also contain an unspecified number of unelected representatives of the army and other interest groups.
Polling appeared to be heavy on election day, and by the end of the voting, the DP, on the basis of its own estimates, declared victory in 81 of 126 constituencies. The British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of America broadcast the news of the DP triumph, and Kampala's streets were filled with DP celebrants. At this point, Muwanga seized control of the Electoral Commission, along with the power to count the ballots, and declared that anyone disputing his count would be subject to a heavy fine and five years in jail. Eighteen hours later, Muwanga announced a UPC victory, with seventy-two seats. Some DP candidates claimed the ballot boxes were simply switched to give their own vote tally to the UPC runner-up. Nevertheless, a small contingent of neutral election watchers, the Commonwealth Observer Group, declared itself satisfied with the validity of the election. Some Ugandans criticized the Commonwealth Observer Group, suggesting that members of the group measured African elections by different standards than those used elsewhere or that they feared civil war if the results were questioned. Indeed, popular perception of a stolen election actually helped bring about the civil war the Commonwealth Observer Group may have feared.
MILITARY RULE UNDER AMIN
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By January 1971, Obote was prepared to rid himself of the potential threat posed by Amin. Departing for the Commonwealth Conference of Heads of Government at Singapore, he relayed orders to loyal Langi officers that Amin and his supporters in the army were to be arrested. Various versions emerged of the way this news was leaked to Amin; in any case, Amin decided to strike first. In the early morning hours of January 25, 1971, mechanized units loyal to him attacked strategic targets in Kampala and the airport at Entebbe, where the first shell fired by a pro-Amin tank commander killed two Roman Catholic priests in the airport waiting room. Amin's troops easily overcame the disorganized opposition to the coup, and Amin almost immediately initiated mass executions of Acholi and Langi troops, whom he believed to be pro-Obote.
The Amin coup was warmly welcomed by most of the people of the Buganda kingdom,
which Obote had attempted to dismantle. They seemed willing to forget that their
new president, Idi Amin, had been the tool of that military suppression. Amin
made the usual statements about his government's intent to play a mere
"caretaker role" until the country could recover sufficiently for civilian rule.
Amin repudiated Obote's nonaligned foreign policy, and his government was
quickly recognized by Israel, Britain, and the United States. By contrast,
presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Jomo Kenyatta
of Kenya, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initially refused to
accept the legitimacy of the new military government. Nyerere, in particular,
opposed Amin's regime, and he offered hospitality to the exiled Obote,
facilitating his attempts to raise a force and return to power.
Amin's military experience, which was virtually his only experience, determined
the character of his rule. He renamed Government House "the Command Post,"
instituted an advisory defense council composed of military commanders, placed
military tribunals above the system of civil law, appointed soldiers to top
government posts and parastatal agencies, and even informed the newly inducted
civilian cabinet ministers that they would be subject to military discipline.
Uganda was, in effect, governed from a collection of military barracks scattered
across the country, where battalion commanders, acting like local warlords,
represented the coercive arm of the government. The GSU was disbanded and
replaced by the State Research Bureau (SRB; see Idi Amin and Military Rule , ch.
5). SRB headquarters at Nakasero became the scene of torture and grisly
executions over the next several years.
Despite its outward display of a military chain of command, Amin's government
was arguably more riddled with rivalries, regional divisions, and ethnic
politics than the UPC coalition that it had replaced. The army itself was an
arena of lethal competition, in which losers were usually eliminated. Within the
officer corps, those trained in Britain opposed those trained in Israel, and
both stood against the untrained, who soon eliminated many of the army's most
experienced officers. In 1966, well before the Amin era, northerners in the army
had assaulted and harassed soldiers from the south. In 1971 and 1972, the
Lugbara and Kakwa (Amin's ethnic group) from the West Nile were slaughtering
northern Acholi and Langi, who were identified with Obote. Then the Kakwa fought
the Lugbara. Amin came to rely on Nubians and on former Anya Nya rebels from
southern Sudan.
The army, which had been progressively expanded under Obote, was further doubled
and redoubled under Amin. Recruitment was largely, but not entirely, in the
north. There were periodic purges, when various battalion commanders were viewed
as potential problems or became real threats. Each purge provided new
opportunities for promotions from the ranks. The commander of the air force,
Smuts Guweddeko, had previously worked as a telephone operator; the unofficial
executioner for the regime, Major Malyamungu, had formerly been a nightwatch
officer. By the mid-1970s, only the most trustworthy military units were allowed
ammunition, although this prohibition did not prevent a series of mutinies and
murders. An attempt by an American journalist, Nicholas Stroh, and his
colleague, Robert Siedle, to investigate one of these barracks outbreaks in 1972
at the Simba battalion in Mbarara led to their disappearances and later deaths.
Amin never forgot the source of his power. He spent much of his time rewarding,
promoting, and manipulating the army. Financing his ever-increasing military
expenditures was a continuing concern. Early in 1972, he reversed foreign
policy-- never a major issue for Amin--to secure financial and military aid from
Muammar Qadhafi of Libya. Amin expelled the remaining Israeli advisers, to whom
he was much indebted, and became vociferously anti-Israel. To induce foreign aid
from Saudi Arabia, he rediscovered his previously neglected Islamic heritage. He
also commissioned the construction of a great mosque on Kampala Hill in the
capital city, but it was never completed because much of the money intended for
it was embezzled.
In September 1972, Amin expelled almost all of Uganda's 50,000 Asians and seized
their property. Although Amin proclaimed that the "common man" was the
beneficiary of this drastic act-- which proved immensely popular--it was
actually the army that emerged with the houses, cars, and businesses of the
departing Asian minority. This expropriation of property proved disastrous for
the already declining economy. Businesses were run into the ground, cement
factories at Tororo and Fort Portal collapsed from lack of maintenance, and
sugar production literally ground to a halt, as unmaintained machinery jammed
permanently. Uganda's export crops were sold by government parastatals, but most
of the foreign currency they earned went for purchasing imports for the army.
The most famous example was the so-called "whiskey run" to Stansted Airport in
Britain, where planeloads of Scotch whiskey, transistor radios, and luxury items
were purchased for Amin to distribute among his officers and troops. An African
proverb, it was said, summed up Amin's treatment of his army: "A dog with a bone
in its mouth can't bite."
The rural African producers, particularly of coffee, turned to smuggling,
especially to Kenya. The smuggling problem became an obsession with Amin; toward
the end of his rule, he appointed his mercenary adviser, the former British
citizen Bob Astles, to take all necessary steps to eliminate the problem. These
steps included orders to shoot smugglers on sight.
Another near-obsession for Amin was the threat of a counterattack by former
president Obote. Shortly after the expulsion of Asians in 1972, Obote did launch
such an attempt across the Tanzanian border into southwestern Uganda. His small
army contingent in twenty-seven trucks set out to capture the southern Ugandan
military post at Masaka but instead settled down to await a general uprising
against Amin, which did not occur. A planned seizure of the airport at Entebbe
by soldiers in an allegedly hijacked East African Airways passenger aircraft was
aborted when Obote's pilot blew out the aircraft's tires and it remained in
Tanzania. Amin was able to mobilize his more reliable Malire Mechanical Regiment
and expel the invaders.
Although jubilant at his success, Amin realized that Obote, with Nyerere's aid,
might try again. He had the SRB and the newly formed Public Safety Unit (PSU)
redouble their efforts to uncover subversives and other imagined enemies of the
state. General fear and insecurity became a way of life for the populace, as
thousands of people disappeared. In an ominous twist, people sometimes learned
by listening to the radio that they were "about to disappear." State terrorism
was evidenced in a series of spectacular incidents; for example, High Court
Judge Benedicto Kiwanuka, former head of government and leader of the banned DP,
was seized directly from his courtroom. Like many other victims, he was forced
to remove his shoes and then bundled into the trunk of a car, never to be seen
alive again. Whether calculated or not, the symbolism of a pair of shoes by the
roadside to mark the passing of a human life was a bizarre yet piercing form of
state terrorism.
Amin did attempt to establish ties with an international terrorist group in July
1976, when he offered the Palestinian hijackers of an Air France flight from Tel
Aviv a protected base at the old airport at Entebbe, from which to press their
demands in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. The dramatic rescue of
the hostages by Israeli commandos was a severe blow to Amin, unassuaged by his
murder of a hospitalized hostage, Dora Block, and his mass execution of Entebbe
airport personnel.
Amin's government, conducted by often erratic personal proclamation, continued
on. Because he was illiterate--a disability shared with most of his higher
ranking officers--Amin relayed orders and policy decisions orally by telephone,
over the radio, and in long rambling speeches to which civil servants learned to
pay close attention. The bureaucracy became paralyzed as government
administrators feared to make what might prove to be a wrong decision. The
minister of defense demanded and was given the Ministry of Education office
building, but then the decision was reversed. Important education files were
lost during their transfer back and forth by wheelbarrow. In many respects,
Amin's government in the 1970s resembled the governments of nineteenth-century
African monarchs, with the same problems of enforcing orders at a distance,
controlling rival factions at court, and rewarding loyal followers with plunder.
However, Amin's regime was possibly less efficient than those of the precolonial
monarchs.
Religious conflict was another characteristic of the Amin regime that had its
origins in the nineteenth century. After rediscovering his Islamic allegiance in
the effort to gain foreign aid from Libya and Saudi Arabia, Amin began to pay
more attention to the formerly deprived Muslims in Uganda, a move which turned
out to be a mixed blessing for them. Muslims began to do well in what economic
opportunities yet remained, the more so if they had relatives in the army.
Construction work began on Kibule Hill, the site of Kampala's most prominent
mosque. Many Ugandan Muslims with a sense of history believed that the Muslim
defeat by Christians in 1889 was finally being redressed. Christians, in turn,
perceived that they were under siege as a religious group; it was clear that
Amin viewed the churches as potential centers of opposition. A number of priests
and ministers disappeared in the course of the 1970s, but the matter reached a
climax with the formal protest against army terrorism in 1977 by Church of
Uganda ministers, led by Archbishop Janan Luwum. Although Luwum's body was
subsequently recovered from a clumsily contrived "auto accident," subsequent
investigations revealed that Luwum had been shot to death by Amin himself. This
latest in a long line of atrocities was greeted with international condemnation,
but apart from the continued trade boycott initiated by the United States in
July 1978, verbal condemnation was not accompanied by action.
By 1978 Amin's circle of close associates had shrunk significantly--the
result of defections and executions. It was increasingly risky to be too close
to Amin, as his vice president and formerly trusted associate, General Mustafa
Adrisi, discovered. When Adrisi was injured in a suspicious auto accident,
troops loyal to him became restive. The once reliable Malire Mechanized Regiment
mutinied, as did other units. In October 1978, Amin sent troops still loyal to
him against the mutineers, some of whom fled across the Tanzanian border. Amin
then claimed that Tanzanian President Nyerere, his perennial enemy, had been at
the root of his troubles. Amin accused Nyerere of waging war against Uganda,
and, hoping to divert attention from his internal troubles and rally Uganda
against the foreign adversary, Amin invaded Tanzanian territory and formally
annexed a section across the Kagera River boundary on November 1, 1978 (see Idi
Amin and Military Rule , ch. 5).
Nyerere mobilized his citizen army reserves and counterattacked, joined by Ugandan exiles united as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). The Ugandan Army retreated steadily, expending much of its energy by looting along the way. Libya's Qadhafi sent 3,000 troops to aid fellow Muslim Amin, but the Libyans soon found themselves on the front line, while behind them Ugandan Army units were using supply trucks to carry their newly plundered wealth in the opposite direction. Tanzania and the UNLA took Kampala in April 1979, and Amin fled by air, first to Libya and later to a seemingly permanent exile at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. The war that had cost Tanzania an estimated US$1 million per day was over. What kind of government would attempt the monumental task of rebuilding the economically and psychologically devastated country, which had lost an estimated 300,000 victims to Amin's murderous eight-year regime?
Data as of December 1990
Library of Congress
Country Studies
